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 Having argued that there is a science which studies being as being, Aristotle goes on to 
inquire, at the beginning of Chapter 3 of Book Gamma of the Metaphysics, whether it 
also pertains to that science to study those truths "which are in mathematics called  axi-
oms."' His answer  is given in the second sentence of the chapter, and is in the affirmative; 
the same science which considers being also considers the axioms: "Evidently, the inquiry 
into these also belongs to one science, and that the science of the philosopher; for these 
truths hold good for everything that is, and not for some special genus apart from others."2 
The clue to the meaning of this sentence is to be found at the opening of Book Gamma. 
There, it was explained that the science of being as being, the "science of the philosopher" 
referred to above, is distinguished from the special sciences in that the latter study 
only the attributes peculiar to different parts of being. Thus it is left to the philosopher 
to study that which is common to all beings, viz., being itself. The quotation above, then, 
is to be understood as saying that the axioms, since they hold good for all beings, fall 
within the province of the science which considers all beings; they cannot fall within the 
province of any of the special sciences, for they do not pertain solely to any special genus 
or part of being. 
 The argument against including the study of the axioms in any of the special sciences 
is quite clear. The text has not yet adequately indicated, however, just why the axioms 
are to be included in the science of being as being. This does not follow merely from the 
impossibility of including the study of the axioms in any special science. The sentence 
quoted above suggests, however, although it does not explicitly state, that the science of 
being as being is the science which considers all that is, i.e., that it is the only such 
science. But the science of being as being does not consider what is peculiar to any part 
of being, as has been said. Therefore, if we are to make the assumption (not stated in 
the sentence quoted) that the science of being as being considers everything about all be-
ings except that which is peculiar to the various parts of being, it follows that that science 
considers all that which is common to all beings. But the axioms are common to all beings, 
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in that they hold good for all beings. Therefore, the science of being as being considers 
the axioms. To put the argument more simply, if the science of being as being considers 
all that which is common to all  beings, and is the only science  which does so, then the 
science of being as being considers the axioms, for they are, in a sense, common to all beings. 
This argument, however, is merely suggested by the text, so far as it has been examined. 
What support does the text give to the thesis that the science of being as being considers 
all that which is common to all beings, and is the only such science? The answer is that this 
thesis completes the  argument. Aristotle gives in the sentence quoted. Admittedly, however, 
the premisses suppressed in that argument might not be these, a possibility which must 
be borne in mind. 
  If one science studies all that which is common to all beings, the question arises why 
this should be so. In the first paragraph of Chapter 3, it is stated that this one science 
inquires into primary substance, as well  as into the axioms. Why, then, to ask a more 
specific question, should not the study of the axioms be distinguished from the study of 
primary substance, and the former or the latter alone be identified with the Wisdom intro-
duced in Book Alpha? A possible answer is that these two studies are both prefectly, and 
therefore equally, universal, in that they both pertain to all things. This maximum 
universality was presented in Book Alpha, however, as the ultimate criterion for Wisdom. 
Therefore, the study of the axioms and the study of primary substance  must equally be 
considered Wisdom. 
  A further problem is this. The axioms are true of being as being,  as  may be learned 
from the third sentence of Chapter 3.  Is this why they hold good for all beings? This 
hypothesis must be borne in mind in examining the rest of the text. 
  Aristotle goes on to say, in the third and fourth sentences of Chapter 3, that all men use 
the axioms in demonstration "as far as the genus to which their demonstrations refer  ex-
tends."' The meaning of this is fairly clear. The axioms hold good for everything that is. 
Consequently, they hold good for whatever men choose to study. Men always,  or usually, 
choose to study only part of everything that is, i.e., only a part of being. Consequently, 
men use the axioms in their reasonings about the parts of being which they study. The 
axioms are applied, however, only to what is included in those parts of being. Exactly what 
Aristotle means by a part or genus of being, and whether these two are strictly the same, 
is not entirely clear. Nor is it clear what his motive is in bringing up the rather obvious 
fact that men use the axioms "just so far as to satisfy their  purposes."' A possible answer is 
that this  is just Aristotle's way of emphasizing his thesis that the axioms, although they are 
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usually used in reasoning about a part of being, nevertheless hold good for all beings. 
 The fifth sentence of Chapter 3 suggests an answer to the question whetherthe axioms 
hold good for all beings because they are true of being as being. This sentence runs as 
follows: "Therefore  since these truths clearly hold good for all things qua being (for this is 
what is common to them), to him who studies being qua being belongs the inquiry into 
these as well."5 Let us impute the following argument to Aristotle. The axioms are true of 
being qua being. Being qua being is common to all beings. Therefore, the axioms are true 
of all beings, since whatever is chosen, the axioms are true of the being of that which has 
been chosen. Therefore, the axioms hold good for all beings. This argument relies upon 
the equation of the expressions "is true of" and "holds good for." What is the justification 
for this equation? It lies in the quotation above. There, it is said that the axioms hold 
good for all things qua being, because being is what is common to all things. Now the 
argument above, the one imputed to Aristotle, explains the connection between the axioms' 
being true of being as being, and their holding good for all beings, and also serves as the 
completion of the argument of the sentence quoted, if the phrases "is true of" and "holds 
good for" are equated. The justification for making this equation, then, and for imputing 
this argument  to. Aristotle, is that doing so is consistent with what he says, and appears 
to bring out some of what is implicit in what he says. 
  Aristotle continues that what has been said explains why he who is conducting a special, 
as  opposed to a universal inquiry, the geometer for example, never inquires into the truth 
or falsehood of the axioms. He uses the axioms, for they hold good for what he is study-
ing, but he does not inquire into their truth or falsehood, because they are not principles 
unique to his field of study. Some natural philosophers, indeed, inquired into the truth of 
the axioms, which is quite understandable, since these  philosophers, thought that they alone 
were inquiring into the whole of nature and into being. Aristotle implies that their mistake 
lay in thinking that all of nature and all of being are identical, whereas actually "nature is 
only one particular genus of being."6 Therefore, it is possible to study all of nature without 
studying all of being. There is a type of philosopher who is above the natural philosopher, 
however, and the study of the axioms does belong to him, for "the discussion of these 
truths also will belong to him whose inquiry is universal and deals with primary  substance."' 
Leaving aside the  prob1.2m of how the study of primary substance can be universal, the 
question remains why the philosopher studies the axioms, aside from the fact that no one 
else can study them, and the fact, suggested earlier, that the science which  considers the 
axioms and that which considers primary substance must both be identified with Wisdom, 
                                    — 31 —
      A X 
i.e., the science of the philosopher. The question, then, is why Aristotle does not recog-
nize two  Wisdoms, neither prior to the other, and two types of  philosophers.  An answer is 
provided in the second paragraph of Chapter 3: "But he who  knows, best about each genus 
must be able to state the most certain principles of his  subject, so that he whose subject 
 is existing things  qua existing must be able to state the most  certain principles of all things. 
This is the philosopher."8 The principles of a given subject here are  evidently the prin-
ciples peculiar to given subject, and do not include principles which might be included also 
in other subjects. Otherwise, there would be no reason to expect the philosopher  in par-
ticular to be able to state  universal principles,  the principles of all things.  The phrase "be 
able to state" in this quotation has the import of "know." That is, he who  knows best 
about each genus knows the most certain principles of his subject.  This  again could be 
stated: he who knows best what is peculiar to each genus knows the most certain prin-
ciples which are peculiar to his subject. A special case of this formula  is  : he who knows 
best about what is peculiar to all beings, i.e., about what is common to  all beings, knows 
the most certain principles which  are peculiar to his subject. But the subject of this  inves-
tigator, the philosopher, is all things. Therefore the  philosopher knows the most certain 
principles of all things,  given the fact that he studies primary substance, because from this 
it follows that he studies all things. This is why there is only one Wisdom, and only one 
type of philosopher who does not stand below other philosophers. 
 It has been established, then, that the philosopher studies the most  certain  principles' of 
all things. The most certain principles of all things are now identified with  the most cer-
tain  of all principles. Aristotle proceeds to prepare his  audience for the statement of the 
most certain  single principle of all. What is the nature of  this  principle? Aristotle claims 
that for the principle to be the most certain of all, several things must be true of it. To 
begin with, it  is impossible to be mistaken with regard to it. It is the best known of prin-
ciples. Anyone who knows anything at all must know it. Therefore, it is nonhypothetical, 
because that which is prerequisite for  knowing' anything is not a hypothesis. It follows that 
anyone approaching any special study, i.e., a study confined to a limited part of being, 
must  know beforehand this most certain of all principles. 
 Towards the middle of the second paragraph of Chapter 3, Aristotle states the principle 
to which he has been alluding: "It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time 
belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect."9 It is admitted that 
qualifications might have to be added  to this statement of the principle. Today, it is 
known as the principle of  contradiction. 
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 Having introduced this principle, Aristotle goes on to say that it is impossible even to 
believe the same thing to be and not to be, i.e., that it is impossible to believe that the 
principle of contradiction does not hold true universally. This follows from the assumption 
of the truth of the principle. For suppose a person was and was not of a certain belief, 
which is to say that this person both believed and did not believe such and such to be 
the case. Now if it is impossible in general for anything both to be and not to be, then 
it is impossible in particular for a person both to be and not to be of a certain belief. 
That is, contrary beliefs are contrary attributes of the person who entertains them, and so 
to maintain contrary beliefs at one time is to be oppositely qualified, in violation of the 
principle of contradiction. The soundness of this argument might well be  questioned  ; my 
purpose, however, is exposition. 
 Following upon the argument just related, Aristotle concludes Chapter 3 by stating: "It 
is for this reason that all who are carrying out a demonstration reduce it to this as an ulti-
mate belief; for this is naturally the starting-point even for all the other  axioms."1° Why is 
the principle of contradiction naturally a starting point for all demonstration? Evidently 
because it is the most certain of all principles. Did it follow from another principle, the 
latter would have to be even more certain, but there is no more certain principle than that 
of contradiction. That Aristotle thinks a principle follows properly only from a more certain 
principle may be gathered from the following statement, in Book Kappa, Chapter 5, in 
which the "truth" to which reference is made is in fact the principle of contradiction: "It 
is not possible to infer this truth itself from a more certain principle, yet this is necessary 
if there is to be completed proof in the full  sense."" 
  This last quotation appears to explain, at least in part, the transition noted above from 
 "most certain principles of all things" to "most certain of all principles." In making this 
transition, it is open to Aristotle to employ the following argument. The most certain 
principles of all things, being the most certain of the principles common to all things, are 
prior to the principles peculiar to any part of being, and to the other principles (if there 
are any) common to all things, and thus are prior to all other principles, and thus must 
be the most certain, since all other principles must follow from them. Why must a principle 
common to all things be prior to a principle peculiar to a part of being? Perhaps because 
any principle from which a principle common to all things followed would have to be equally, 
or more, general than that principle, and thus would itself have to be common to all things. 
  What is the source of the certainty of the principle of contradiction? Aristotle speaks, in 
the second paragraph of Chapter 3, in such a way as to suggest that this certainty is  iden-
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tical with, or a consequence of, the impossibility of being mistaken with regard to the prin-
ciple: "... the most certain principle of all is that regarding which it is impossible to be 
 mistaken."" Now why is it impossible to be mistaken with regard to the principle of con-
tradiction? One reply has already been given: The principle is true, and this, as has been 
argued, makes its denial impossible. Following this line of reasoning, we ask why the prin-
ciple is true, or what is the meaning  of saying it is true. Again, a possible reply is that 
it is true as a matter of fact. That is, beings are such that the principle is true. This sug-
gests several further questions: How do we know that beings are such that the principle 
is true? Is the principle contingently or necessarily true? That is, is the fact that beings 
are such that the principle is true a contingent or a necessary fact? What is of interest is 
 this: what answers to these questions, supposing them to be appropriate, does Aristotle 
give, and, if he is silent on the subject, what answers are consistent with and suggested 
by what he says? 
  Having solved to his satisfaction the  aporia of Book Beta, concerning whether the axioms 
 "on which all men base their proofs" are to be considered b
y the science which deals with 
 substance," Aristotle is ready, in Chapter 4 of Book Gamma, to give whatever proof can 
be given of the principle of contradiction. He opens Chapter 4 by pointing out again that 
some people have denied this principle (in word, of course, not in fact). Among these are 
many writers  about nature. These include, as appears from the last part of Chapter 3, the 
Heracliteans. It is worth bearing in mind that perhaps these writers were overly impressed 
with the phenomenon of change, or movement. The third sentence of Chapter 4 is a state-
ment deserving of special attention, as it is rendered comprehensible only by what has 
gone before: "But we have now posited that it is impossible for anything at the same time 
to be and not to be, and by this means have shown that this is the most indisputable of 
all  principles."" How can the indisputability of a principle be shown merely by positing 
it? Evidently, Aristotle has in mind the argument given above: that if the principle is true, 
then it is impossible to judge its denial to be the case, to use the language of the first 
sentence of Chapter 4.  In this sense, the principle must be admitted to be indisputable, 
once it has been posited to be true. The sentence quoted above, it should be noted, tends 
to bear out the view, suggested above, that the fact that it is impossible to be mistaken 
about the principle of contradiction follows simply from its truth. 
  Aristotle continues that it is impossible to give a demonstration of everything, since this 
would involve an infinite regress, since no principle could be first. Such a demonstration 
as this, according to Aristotle, is really no demonstration at all. This concept of  demonstra-
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tion is parallel to the modern definition of a proof in logic as a finite column of sentence 
forms having certain characteristics, if this observation be not beside the point. Aristotle 
does not remark that the attempt to demonstrate veything might also result in a great 
circular argument, if there is only a finite number of propositions capable of entering 
into any demonstration. But obviously, this also would fail to be true demonstration. 
  Some principles, then, are indemonstrable. It argues what of education, i.e., want of 
training in logic, which is preparatory to other studies, not to know which principles are 
indemonstrable. Aristotle defies anyone to name a principle more certain than that of 
contradiction, from which that principle could follow. 
 Immediately following this challenge, in the first sentence of the second paragraph of 
Chapter 4, Aristotle says: "We can, however, demonstrate negatively even that this view is 
 impossible.'"5 What view is intended? Evidently the view that the indemonstrable principle 
is not that of contradiction, or that the indemonstrable principles, if there be more than 
one, do not include this principle. Aristotle promises to establish the principle of contra-
tion by negative demonstration, provided that his opponent will agree to say something, 
i.e., something having meaning both for himself and another. If he will not do this, then 
there is no basis for rational discourse with him. If he does comply, then he can be gotten 
to admit the principle of contradiction. On the assumption that Aristotle is correct in think-
ing that the principle of contradiction is prior to all other principles, he cannot employ 
demonstration proper, for then he must assume what he is trying to prove. Nor can he 
demand that his opponent say that something either is or is not, for again, this would, in 
a sense, be assuming what he is trying to prove. He wants to conclude that if what we 
say is to have meaning, then we must say of what we are talking about that it either is 
or is not qualified in a certain respect. Therefore he cannot assume to begin with that this 
is the case; but this assumption is all that could justify his  demanding of his opponent that 
he say that something either is or is not. That is, he cannot make this demand unless the 
principle is true, and he cannot assume the truth of the principle. If Aristotle's opponent 
complies with his request that he say something that has meaning both for himself and 
for another, then "demonstration is possible; for we shall already have something  definite."" 
What does this mean? Perhaps the meaning is that we will have a definite starting point 
for reasoning. Or perhaps, by "something definite," Aristotle means something which either 
is or is not qualified in a certain respect, his idea being then that the truth of the prin-
ciple of  contradiction will somehow appear in whatever his opponent says. The person re-
sponsible for the proof is the opponent of  the principle, "for while  disowning reason he 
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listens to  reason."17 The method, evidently, is to get the opponent of the principle to admit 
that he is resorting to it, and he must resort to it if he is to say anything meaningful. 
 It appears, from the way Aristotle has introduced his defense of the principle of contra-
diction, that he believes the following to be the case. If it is possible to make meaningful 
statements, or if it is possible to reason, then the principle of contradiction is true. Several 
questions arise if it is true that Aristotle accepts this implication. Would he say, more 
generally, that if it is possible to know anything, then the principle of contradiction holds 
true? Secondly, does he take the occurrence of meaningful statements, or of reason, or of 
knowledge, to be a fact which establishes the truth of the principle? 
 Let us now try to determine the sense of Aristotle's arguments in Chapter 4, of which 
there are eight. He states his first argument as follows: "First then this at least is obviously 
true, that the word  'be' or  'not be' has a definite meaning, so that not everything will 
be  'so and not so.' "18 The import of this statement appears to be that the expressions "be" 
and "not be," since they have definite meanings, have definite natures, and thus may serve 
as examples of things to which the principle of contradiction applies. The missing premiss 
could be that that which has a definite nature is "so" while not being "not so." Evidently 
the sentence quoted is to be regarded as a separate, incomplete, argument for the principle 
of contradiction, incomplete in that it does not show the principle to be true universally. 
  Aristotle's next argument is the  longest, of them. He begins: "Again, if  'man' has one 
meaning, let this be  'two-footed  animal'; by having one meaning I understand this: — if 
 `man' means  'X', then if A is a man  'X' will be what  'being a man' means  for  him."19 
Now later on in this paragraph, Aristotle says, "... not to have one meaning is to have no 
 meaning."2° From this it follows that if what Aristotle's opponent says is to have any mean-
ing, it must have one meaning. But what follows if what this person says has one meaning? 
What is involved in someone's aying something and meaning one thing by it? Suppose 
that Aristotle's opponent uses the term "man" and means one thing by it. Suppose that he 
means by it "two-footed animal." Now if "two-footed animal" is the meaning of "man" for 
Aristotle's opponent, then the latter must admit that "two-footed animal" is what "being a 
man" means for a man, in accordance with the opening sentence of Aristotle's argument. 
Evidently, then, Aristotle's opponent, without being aware of it, is taking "two-footed ani-
mal" to be what man essentially is. To complete the argument, it follows that man has an 
essence. But an essence is something that is "so," and hence is something to which the 
principle of contradiction applies. To restate the argument: If a word  means anything, it 
means one thing, and that one thing is the essence of that which the word names. So  say-
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ing anything meaningfully involves the assumption of essences, which, however, are "so," 
and to which therefore the principle of contradiction applies. This statement of the argu-
ment is not what Aristotle says, but an attempt to complete what he says. It will have to 
be checked against his own completion of the argument. As to what has been said so far, 
the questions arise why, to mean anything, a word must mean one thing, and why that one 
thing is the essence of that which is named. 
  Aristotle continues that if the name "man" has one meaning, then "being a man" cannot 
mean precisely "not being a man." Why is this? Perhaps the following reasoning can 
explain what is involved. If "man" has one meaning, then man has an essence, for this 
essence is the one meaning of "man," (or perhaps this meaning is the statement of this 
essence; it is hard to tell from the sentence quoted at the head of the immediately preceding 
paragraph). Call this essence "two-footedness." Then being two-footed is being a man. But 
being two-footed is the essence of man, and hence it is "so" and is not "not so." Hence, 
being a man, since it is the same as being two-footed, is also "so" and not "not so." That 
is, being a man is not also not being a man. There seems no guarantee that this is what 
Aristotle has in mind, however, since his argument is cryptic at this point. 
 The question at issue, Aristotle continues in the fifth paragraph of Chapter 4, is whether 
in fact (not whether in name) the same thing can at the same time be and not be a man. 
This appears to answer some questions asked earlier. Why is the principle of contradiction 
true? Because it is true of beings. That is, because it is true of facts. But the facts upon 
which the principle is grounded are not contingent facts. Aristotle is asking how things 
must necessarily be. The fact that beings are such that the principle is true is a necessary 
fact. Besides the question of contingency, the question also arose how we know that beings 
are such that the principle is true. It follows from what has been said that a partial 
answer is that we can show that they must be so. 
 Aristotle concludes this part of his second argument as follows. If "man" means anything, 
it must mean one thing. Let that one thing be "two-footed animal." Then anything which 
is a man cannot not be a two-footed animal. This is the meaning of "being necessarily." 
 The essential point in the second half of the present argument is that those who deny 
the principle of contradiction must "do away with substance and essence."21 This is for the 
reason anticipated above, that substance and essence are so. But if there is no such thing 
as substance, and all attributes are accidental, of what can these accidents be  predicated? 
An accident can be an accident of an accident only when both are accidents of the same 
subject. For example, the white can be musical when both are accidental to man. But 
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Socrates is musical in a different sense. The former sense reduces to the latter, in that in 
the former case, "white" and  "musical" must be attributed to a substance in the same 
sense in which  "musical" is attributed to Socrates in the latter case. Hence, even if we 
start out affirming that all attributes are accidental, we arrive at the necessity of substance. 
But the principle of contradiction holds true of substance. 
 In his third argument, Aristotle claims that if it is true to say of a man even that he is 
not a man, then surely we can also say of him that he is not a trireme, and therefore, con-
sistently denying the principle of contradiction, that he is a trireme. But according to the 
followers of Protagoras, if anyone thinks that a man is not a trireme, then he is not a  tri-
reme. Thus, the denial of the principle of contradiction, taken along with the Protagorean 
doctrine that all appearances and opinions are true, compels us to admit that all things 
are one: "And thus we get the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that all things are mixed together; 
so that nothing really exists. They seem, then, to be speaking of the indeterminate, and 
while fancying themselves to be speaking of being, they are speaking about non-being; 
for it is that which exists potentially and not in complete reality that is indeterminate."22 
He argues later that the Protagoreans must deny the principle of contradiction. In speaking 
of the indeterminate, Aristotle might be thinking of the material cause. The determinate, 
then, would appear to be the formal cause. Definiteness appears to be equated with reality 
(in the sense of actuality) in this passage. 
 The fourth argument is that those who deny the principle of contradiction must also 
deny that of excluded middle, i.e., they must maintain that "it is not necessary either to 
assert or to deny." The argument runs as follows: "For if it is true that a thing is a man 
and a not-man, evidently also it will be neither a man nor a not-man. For to the two asser-
tions there answer two negations, and if the former is treated as a single proposition com-
pounded out of two, the latter also is a single proposition opposite to the former."23 What 
is the meaning of this argument? He who denies the principle of contradiction says the 
following: f(x)&—f(x), or, something is and is not of a certain description. But, since he 
said  f  (x), he must say  —f(x), and since he said  —f  (x), he must say  —f(x) . But then 
he  is committed to  —f(x)&—  —f(x), the denial of the principle of excluded middle. 
  The fifth argument is interesting in that it indicates more clearly why Aristotle associ-
ates indefiniteness with nonbeing and definiteness with being. This argument may be 
summarized as follows. One can deny the principle of contradiction in all or only in some 
cases. If it be denied only in some cases, then it is allowed to hold true in others. If it 
be denied in all cases, then either (a) whatever can be affirmed can be denied and  what-
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ever can be denied can be affirmed, or (b) whatever can be affirmed can be denied, 
but some things that can be denied cannot be affirmed. If alternative (b)  is chosen, it 
must be admitted that something definitely is not. If alternative (a) is chosen, then the 
opponent of the principle, according to Aristotle, is saying that nothing has any definite 
nature, i.e., that nothing is. But if nothing  is, how comes it that the opponent of the prin-
ciple is talking? Aristotle seems first to be taking the verb "to be" in a copulative, and 
then in an existential sense. But then being, and being semething definite, are for Aris-
totle inseparable. That which is indefinite can be only potentially, as was said above. 
 The sixth argument manifests the virtues of brevity and clarity: "Again, if when the as-
sertion is true, the negation is false, and when this is true, the affirmation is false, it will 
not be possible to assert and deny the same thing truly at the same time. But perhaps they 
might say this was the very question at issue."24 This argument is valid, but it presupposes 
what it is trying to prove, viz., that statements of the form  f(x)  &—f(x) must be negated 
to be true. 
 The thrust of the seventh argument is that men, even those who deny the principle of 
contradiction, do not behave as if the principle did not hold true. They act, for example, 
as if they believed some things to be better than others. In addition, at the very beginning 
of this argument, Aristotle makes one of his clearest and strongest objections against those 
who deny the principle. He asks "what they can mean by saying that the nature of  exist-
ing, things is of this kind."25 For this is just the type of statement hat they cannot make. 
 There are a number of ways of interpreting the claim that a thing can be both so and 
not so. It can be taken to mean that a thing can have a certain quality to the fullest ex-
tent and at the same time lack that quality to the fullest extent. But it might also be 
taken to mean that a thing can have a certain quality to some extent, and lack it to some 
extent. The purpose of Aristotle's eighth argument is to point out that on the latter inter-
pretation, definiteness comes into the picture because the degree to which a thing has a 
certain quality is definite in fact, and may be more or less definitely specified. Even 
supposing that the number 2 is partially even and partially not, still it is more even than 
the number 3. This view denies the equal sharing in all attributes of all things which 
would (supposedly) make all things indistinguishable. 
 The eight arguments related above are designed to refute those who deny the principle 
of contradiction by showing that in denying it they must assume its truth. Aristotle goes 
on, in Chapter 5 of Book Gamma, to try to show that the original grounds for denying the 
principle are inadequate. This chapter is easier to comprehend than those so far considered. 
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I shall now explain some of the main points that Aristotle makes. 
 Some early thinkers, basing their conclusions upon their observation of natural processes, 
maintained that contraries can issue from the same thing. Therefore, so their argument 
runs, since "that which is cannot come to  be,'26 contraries must coexist in some things. 
Aristotle objects that a thing may  _potentially be two contraries at the same time, but 
may not actually be so. He objects to that part of the argument just related which stands 
in quotation marks, on the grounds that that which is actually can have come into being 
from that which was not actually, but was potentially. He also remarks that not all existing 
things are subject to change. 
 Sensible things, Aristotle continues, should not be identified with all of reality. This 
identification results from equating knowledge with sensation (an equation inconsistent with 
what he asserts at the beginning of Book Alpha).27 Those who conclude from the move-
ment they see in what they sense that no knowledge is possible, should remember several 
things: that what is losing a quality still has some of that quality, and that of that which 
is coming to be, something must exist already; that things may change in quantity while 
remaining the same in quality (but changes in quantity make a thing no less knowable, 
for it is in virtue of the form of a thing that we know  it); that the world of constant 
change is but a small part even of the physical universe; and again, that there is, in addi-
tion to the changing, "something whose nature is changeless."28 
  Furthermore, no sense gives contradictory information about its proper object at a given 
time. Even at different times, no sense gives contradictory information about a sensible 
quality like sweetness, but only connects it with different objects. The sensible quality 
of sweetness is something so, and of necessity so. In general, sensation gives no support to 
those who deny the principle of  contradiction, for the same thing does not appear different 
to the same sense, in the same respect, under the same conditions, at the same time. 
  From what has been said, it appears that  according to Aristotle, the truth of the prin-
ciple of contradiction is entailed by a characteristic necessarily exhibited by all existing 
things, viz., their definiteness. To exist, for Aristotle, is to be so but not at the same time 
and in the same respect not so. For a thing to exist, then, is for it to be such that the 
 principle of contradiction is true of it. 
  Now let us examine the brief  discussion of the principle of contradiction that is to be 
 found  in Plato's Republic at 43 ff. (Stephanus pagination). Here, Socrates asserts that "the 
 same thing will not at one and the same time, in the same part of it, and in the same 
 relation, do two opposite things or be in two opposite states; so that if we find such  con-
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junction of opposites in these elements, we may be sure that they are not one, but  sever-
al."" It is denied that a given thing can be at rest and in motion "at one and the same 
time, and in the same part of it." It is agreed that if a man is moving a part of his body 
while otherwise remaining at rest, then it is proper to say that "one part of him  [is) at 
rest and another in motion," and improper to say that "the same man  [is) at the same 
time at rest and in motion." Again, consider a spinning top with fixed, perpendicular axis 
of rotation. It is not true to say that the whole top is at once at rest and in motion, for, 
to speak accurately, the axis is at rest while the circumference is in motion. The final 
statement of the principle in this text runs as follows: It is not the case that "one and the 
same thing  [can) at one and the same time, in the same part of it, and in the same re-
lation, be acted upon in two opposite ways, or be two opposite things, or produce two 
opposite effects." 
 How does Plato resolve apparent violations of the principle of contradiction as he has 
stated it? It appears that he tends to resort to distinguishing between the different parts 
of a thing. His examples all have to do with rest and motion, and all are resolved in this 
way. 
 How might Aristotle deal with examples of this  type?  Take the case of a man waving 
his arms, but otherwise remaining still. Plato, in this case, minimizes, or, in effect, denies 
the wholeness or unity of the man, and takes the position that certain parts of him, as 
individual things, move, while another part of him, as a distinct individual, remains at rest. 
This appears to be his thinking in refusing to speak of the man as a whole, and in resolv-
ing the apparent contradiction simply by making a sharp distinction between the various 
parts of the man. Aristotle, in contrast, cannot minimize much less deny the wholeness of 
the man. This wholeness is the same as his existence, for to be is to be one, and to be 
one is to be, according to Aristotle. Aristotle identifies the man with his substance. The 
substance, that is to say, is what preserves the identity of the man. The man is a sub-
stance having certain attributes as accidents. This being Aristotle's view, it would seem 
that he must resolve the contradiction in question by showing that the movement and rest 
of the man are noncontradictory accidents of him. Plato, on the other hand, at least in the 
passages quoted above, does not appear to be concerned with the problem how it can be 
one man which both moves and does not move. 
  The problem that arises out of these considerations would appear to be of some impor-
tance. It is said that no thing can be oppositely qualified. But what is to count as a thing 
in this context? Aristotle's answer appears to be: an individual identifiable by its separate 
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substance. Plato, however, in the passages quoted above, gives no independent criterion of 
individuality. Apparently, in these passages, he presupposes that individuality is to be de-
fined in terms of amenability to the principle of contradiction. How does this criterion of 
individuality, if indeed such it be, relate to any other such criteria that might be found in 
Plato? Does Aristotle, for his part, offer any ultimately satisfactory answer to the question 
what is to count as an individual with respect to the principle of contradiction? What, 
moreover, speaking in general, is  the proper criterion of individuality with respect to this 
principle? Another, broader, question suggests itself. What, really, is the place or role of 
the principle of contradiction in human thought and discourse? Surely Aristotle was mis-
taken to suggest that it is to be regarded as a first principle from  which  various important 
truths follow. Perhaps he came closer to an accurate view when he linked the principle 
with the problem of linguistic meaning. I shall let these questions form the conclusion of 
this paper. 
                              NOTES 
  1. Aristotle's Metaphysics, trans. W. D. Ross; in The Basic Works of Aristotle , ed. Richard 
    McKeon, Random House (New York: 1941); 1005a. 
  2. Ibid., 1005a. 
  3. Ibid., 1005a. 
  4. Ibid., 1005a. 
  5. Ibid., 1005a. 
  6. Ibid., 1005a. 
 7.  Ibid., 1005a-1005b. 
  8. Ibid., 1005b. 
  9. Ibid.,  1005b. 
 10. Ibid., 1005b. 
 11. Ibid., 1062a. 
 12. Ibid., 1005b. 
13. See Metaphysics, 995b. • 
 14. Ibid., 1006a. 
 15. Ibid., 1006a. 
 16. Ibid., 1006a. 
 17. Ibid.,  1006a. 
 18. Ibid., 1006a. 
 19. Ibid., 1006a. 
20. Ibid., 1006b. 
21. Ibid., 1007a. 
22.  Ibid., 1007b. 
23.  Ibid., 1008a. 
 -  42  -
      Aristotle on the Principle of Contradiction: Book Gamma of the  Metaphysics 
24. Ibid., 1008a-1008b. 
25.  Ibid., 1008b. 
26.  Ibid., 1009a. 
 27, See Metaphysics, Book Alpha, Chapter 1: especially 981b 10 ff. and 25 ff. 
 28. Metaphysics,  1010a. 
29. Plato's Republic, trans. A. D. Lindsay; Everyman's Library, J. M. Dent (London: 1969). 
 All quotations from 436 ff.
 —  43  —
